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I. INTRODUCTION
Features like resilience, power consumption, and availability of large scale computing system strongly
depend on 1- the complexity of individual components (e.g. the gate count of each chip) and 2- the number
of components in the system. Exa-scale computing systems and networks of 3G devices are examples of
distributed systems composed of a huge number of high complexity individual devices. Indeed, the FIT
(Failures In Time) rate of individual hardware components, when scaling to peta- and exa-scale systems,
becomes a hard challenge to the collective efficiency or even reasonable functionality for the platform.
A first step to mantain systemic functionality and efficiency is the adoption of hardware design tech-
niques which improve the individual component. Considering the case of fault resilience, multi-core sockets
used on many-core systems must adopt resiliency techniques to reduce the FIT (Failures In Time) rate.
This design trend is already clear in the transition between past tera-scale systems, adopting commodity
processors with 0.1 ÷ 0.5 fails per year per socket, to peta-scale systems, where the failure rate could
be reduced to 0.001 fails per year per socket [1] adopting hardware design techniques like memory and
bus encoding, memory scrubbing, provision of spare processors and memories. Even considering those
reduced FIT rates and a very limited number of components, mission critical/life support systems mandate
for architectures adopting double or triple redundancy. In practice, petaFLOPS designs based on resilient
sockets adopting such countermeasures are characterized by a rate of system-stopping features in the range
of a few days, while a system failure rate in the range of few hours is displayed by systems mounting
less resilient sockets. [2].
Without additional measures, the FIT rate of exa-scale systems becomes unacceptable due to the
scaling in the number of components. Analogously, for what regards power and thermal issues, each
socket and component is nowadays designed keeping the energetic concerns as key drivers but systemic
countermeasures are required due to the numerosity of components.
In our vision, a necessary feature on larger scale architectures is the detection and collation of relevant
information about faults and critical events and, due to the distributed nature of the system, the reliable
propagation of this awareness up through the system hierarchy. In other words, the system must be rendered
fault-aware to be able to choose and enact the actual system fault response.
Based on these considerations, the EURETILE project starts bottom-up proposing a mechanism that
creates a systemic awareness of fault and critical events, the LO|FA|MO design: a distributed, mutual
watch-dog paradigm which enables the management of faults and critical events in large scale systems.
The LO|FA|MO design can complement a pro-active mitigation approach, i.e. the enforcing of preventive
actions (e.g. preemptive process migration, dynamic clock frequency reduction for individual components,
dynamic routing strategies, etc.) before the failure occurs, so as to avoid faults that can reasonably be
expected or minimize the impact of those who can not.
In this paper, we will mainly focus on the requirements imposed by 1-exa-scale systems [3], i.e.
an assembly of tens or hundreds of thousands of processors, hundreds of I/O nodes and thousands of
disks, and 2- future many-tile sockets; however, similar techniques could be applied to large networks of
independent, autonomous devices.
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2Our approach should mitigate the performance penalty and productivity reduction due to work loss and
failure recovery, obtainable using exclusively the conventional approach to fault tolerance (checkpoint-
ing/failure/rollback), which is foreseen to be problematic [1].
With the assistance of some hardware components located in the DNP (Distributing Network Processor),
the router of our APEnet+, the LO|FA|MO design paradigm employs some ’watchdog’ techniques for
reciprocal fault diagnosis between the DNP itself and a companion ’host processing element’ within a
node or on nodes which are neighbouring in the APEnet+ mesh topology; moreover, it employs a number
of best-effort heuristics for delivering the diagnostic data even in case of faulty or broken links along an
auxiliary support network. This network is a possibly low-speed, but highly reliable, diagnostic-dedicated,
independent one, which leans on its high-speed 3D toroidal companion mesh in the extreme case of its
own failing.
Once complemented with diagnostic facilities that monitor whatever metrics are deemed relevant to
the prediction of faults (e.g. temperature and voltage/current probes, BER counters, etc.), LO|FA|MO is a
keystone upon which a fault management system can draw inferences that drive its strategies and actions
to keep the system up and running.
Future work is aimed towards increasing the capabilities of the DNP regarding local re-routing, in sight
of the most ambitious goal of building a network mesh whose routing is deadlock-free and fault-tolerant.
II. DEFINITIONS
In this section we establish a basic terminology to describe a fault (and critical event) tolerant system,
which will be used in the following sections of this document. First of all, from now on we will use fault
as abbreviation for fault and critical event. Then, we split the fault-tolerance problem in two major key
areas: fault awareness and fault reactivity:
• Fault awareness is the capability of the system to assess its own health status, in order to acknowledge
faults that have already appeared or to make guesses about those likely to occur. Going bottom-up,
this ’introspection’ can be reduced to two aspects:
– Local fault detection, the capability of a device to perform a number of HW and SW tests to
detect a condition of fault in itself or other contiguous devices.
– Systemic fault awareness, the collation of diagnostics propagated throughout the whole network
by the local detecting sub-systems to compose a global picture of the system’s health.
• Fault reactivity is the range of initiatives that the system enacts, under the presumptions it can make
when its own global health is known to it, to prevent a fault situation which is about to occur or to
gracefully degrade its performance instead of bringing the whole system to a stop when the fault has
occurred. Going top-down, this ’self-adjustment’ can be reduced to two aspects:
– Systemic response, the set of strategies that the system can choose to apply, following inferences
that it can make from its own diagnostic self-image, to prevent and counter the faults.
– Local readjustment, the set of readjustments that can be locally enacted to prevent and counter
the faults, e.g. reduction in clock frequency, changes to the routing tables to bypass a faulty link,
remapping the assignment of tasks to nodes, etc..
It is clear that a complete design of a fault-tolerant architecture must give detailed specifications in each
of the abovementioned areas. On the other hand, the challenging part for the most interesting fault-tolerant
features is the actual implementation, which cannot be detached from a low-level specification of the host
architecture. For example, task migration capabilities are derived from process management features of
the host operating system; application checkpointing is strictly bound to storage options available to the
host node; protection from memory errors by ECC is a low-level addition to the host memory architecture,
etc..
Our idea with LO|FA|MO is that of a fault-tolerant framework which is as host-agnostic as possible.
By encapsulating as many features as can be accommodated independently from such host specifications
3Fig. 1. The Network Processor of each leaf in the many-tile HW system is equipped with its own LO|FA|MO components. The local
Fault Awareness is propagated towards the upper hierarchy levels, creating systemic Fault Awareness. Fault reactions could be autonomously
initiated by sub-system controllers or could require a systemic response.
in LO|FA|MO, we strive to achieve a clear separation of problems - with the hope this leads to easier
solution - and a degree of design reuse.
By saying this, we make clear from the start that LO|FA|MO, by its very nature, has to be restricted
to the side of fault-awareness.
III. FAULT AWARENESS: GLOBAL SCENARIO HYPOTHESES
We give here a sketch of an architecture where LO|FA|MO is employed. We assume a computing
mesh where every node is a combination of the hardware supporting LO|FA|MO, i.e. a DNP (Distributing
Network Processor), mated to a host processing element; beyond the communication facilities provided
by the DNP, the host exposes another communication interface towards an auxiliary ’service network’
(more details in section III-D).
Failures can generally be of commission and omission type: the former encompasses the case of failing
elements performing their tasks in an incorrect or inconsistent way (e.g. corruption in node memory,
corruption in transmitted messages, packet misrouting, etc.); the latter deals with the case of failing
elements skipping their tasks altogether (e.g. node stops responding due to crash failure, power outage or
burn-out, message passing does not progress due to link disconnection, etc.).
The most general kind of faults are those where the behaviour of a faulty component is assumed to
possibly be completely random as to its correctness; in literature, fault-tolerance to this kind of faults is
defined Byzantine fault-tolerance [6]. Byzantine failures can be seen as undetectable commission failures
or, where possible, as malicious activity by some agent which is trying to sabotage the network. This
kind of failures is explicitly not covered here.
4With this restriction, detectable commission failures signal either a component that is about to break or
keeps on working wrong, while omission failures, when permanent, mostly stand for an already broken
or disconnected component.
In this picture, the LO|FA|MO design is charged of polling the supplied sources of diagnostic data;
any inconsistent value, be it any value beyond a certain threshold or a timed-out update of a watchdog
counter, is a failure to report. LO|FA|MO attempts then to push this report along the service network -
which means, in emergency cases, leaning against the neighbouring DNP’s - towards an upper layer Fault
Supervisor.
As per previous definitions, we remark that the only behaviours LO|FA|MO foresees for a failing
component are two:
• sick - the component has a rate of detected commission failures beyond the compatibility threshold
of normal operativity → this may need action;
• failed - the component has a permanent commission failure (it keeps on working wrong) or simply
stops participating in the network, i.e. it has a permanent omission failure (it has broken) → this
needs action.
A. EURETILE Platforms terms and definitions
Here we introduce a few concepts about the EURETILE platforms and we define the terms used in the
following sections to refer to the platform components.
EURETILE
architecture
A many-tile system, where the elementary HW tile is a multi-processor, which
includes a Distributed Network Processor (for inter-tile communication), a
Host processor (for control, user interface and sequential computations), and
a floating-point numerical engine (for high intensity arithmetic computations),
potentially disjointed from the Host processor.
DNP Distributed Network Processor, the component implementing the 3D torus
interconnection network between the tiles, providing RDMA support for data
transfers. The two implementations of the DNP are:
• APEnet+, an FPGA-based card for low latency, high bandwidth direct net-
work interconnection, supporting state-of-the-art wire speeds and providing
a PCIe X8 Gen2 interface [7];
• DNP-VEP, a SystemC TLM model of the DNP for the Virtual EURETILE
Platform (see below).
The DNP Core is the internal DNP logic, including the routing logic and
the RDMA engine; it does not include the links and the Bus interface. The
functionalities of the DNP core are likewise implemented both in DNP-VEP
and in APEnet+.
Host The processor in the tile running the OS and interfacing with the DNP and the
peripherals through a Bus.
Virtual EURETILE
Platform
The EURETILE simulation platform, integrated with the SW toolchain and
available to run applications and to collect profiling data. This platform
implements the EURETILE architecture with a basic tile that includes: a RISC-
like Host processor, a SystemC model of the DNP (DNP-VEP), an external
memory and a number of peripherals.
5QUonG HPC Plat-
form
The EURETILE demonstration hardware platform, whose basic tile includes: an
x86-64 multiprocessor as Host, an APEnet+ card and a GPU as floating-point
accelerator. [8].
In figure 2 the two flavours of the EURETILE tile are schematically shown; we stress on the fact that
their connectivity is ensured either by the DNP to create the 3D torus topology and by a Service Network
for the diagnostic purposes described in section III-D.
Fig. 2. The EURETILE platforms.
B. Local fault monitor
The Local Fault Monitor (LO|FA|MO) is the mechanism chosen to obtain the fault-awareness; it
implements health self-tests for a number of hardware devices and takes care of propagating the deriving
information. Moreover, the devices are able to monitor other contiguous devices and communicate their
faulty status.
Synthetically, each device is able to:
• check/elaborate/store/transmit its own status;
• monitor other contiguous devices.
In the EURETILE platform, the actors of the described mechanism are the DNP/APEnet+ and the Host
sub-system (Intel for the QUonG platform, a RISC-like model for the Virtual EURETILE Platform). The
DNP is able to run self-tests on its own links and logic, as well as to retrieve information from its own
temperature and electrical sensors. All information pertaining to the sub-systems status is gathered by
the LO|FA|MO-appointed component inside the DNP itself and stored in a DNP WatchDog register (see
IV-A). A second register inside the DNP is dedicated to the surveillance of the health status of the Host,
with LO|FA|MO performing periodic checks of the Host WD register.
In the event the Host on one or more nearest neighbouring nodes were faulty, a third register, the Host
Remote Fault descriptor register, would end up containing information about the nature of the remote fault.
The self-test capabilities of the DNP links and logic allow mutual monitoring between nearest neighbour
6DNP’s, all of them acting as watchdog for one another.
The key points for this LO|FA|MO implementation are:
• the presence of a Host Fault Manager (Host FM), a software process running on the Host that
is aware of the Host local status, is able to read/write the DNP internal registers and the DNP
local/global and Host watchdog registers and can send messages through the Service Network.
• the presence of a DNP Fault Manager (DNP FM), a component residing on the DNP that is able
to collect the information about the DNP health status, to read/write the DNP local/global and Host
watchdog registers and to send messages through the 3D Network.
Figure 3 illustrates the basic platform configuration detailing the position and the communication paths
of the Host Fault Manager and the DNP Fault Manager.
Keeping to the definitions given above, the task of LO|FA|MO thus encloses the whole of Local fault
detection and the interface to the Fault Awareness system.
Fig. 3. The basic EURETILE platform configuration showing the position and the communication paths of the Host Fault Manager and
the DNP Fault Manager in a LO|FA|MO implementation. The Host watchdog register stores info about Host Faults. The DNP watchdog
register stores info about local or global faults of the networking system. The Host Remote Fault Descriptor contains information about the
nature of remote Host Faults.
C. Fault Supervisor
The Fault Supervisor is the generic term that encompasses the set of processes receiving the output
of the LO|FA|MO machinery; its duty is to create systemic Fault Awareness and to issue appropriate
systemic Fault Responses.
7For a small number of nodes, the Fault Supervisor could be implemented as a single software process
running on an appointed ’master node’ of the system; for larger systems, a process cloud residing on a
subset of nodes participating in a hierarchy would certainly be more scalable.
The Fault Supervisor is kept timely fed by the set of DNP Local Fault Managers and Host Local Fault
Managers, with periodic updates about their health.
This supervisor is the ’systemic intelligence’ that embodies the fault awareness for the system and drives
its response; all information (or lack thereof, in case of omission failures from faulty nodes, which is
information as well) is brought by the LO|FA|MO network to the Fault Supervisor system, so that it can
choose any fault prediction, prevention and reaction strategy it deems feasible.
The Fault supervisor is a critical component about which, in the following, we dismiss to provide any more
details. This document describes only the LO|FA|MO mechanism and its specific implementation on the
QUonG and VEP Platforms; we acknowledge its presence - after all, it is the target of all communications
from LO|FA|MO- but we are agnostic about anything regarding its implementation.
D. Service network
Besides APEnet+’s high speed 3D mesh, LO|FA|MO expects the system nodes to partake in a secondary,
diagnostic-dedicated network fabric to which only the Host has access. In ordinary conditions, the DNP
relays the gathered diagnostic data to its Host companion which, through this network, in turn relays
them to the Fault Supervisor. In this way, the high speed network is unencumbered from dealing with the
added traffic of the health status reports.
We expect this service network to be a relatively inexpensive local interconnect. On the HPC market,
Ethernet is a mature technology, mostly ubiquitous presence for any architecture we think to match the
APEnet+ board with - e.g., our QUonG platform cluster node prototype is a Supermicro R© board equipped
with dual Gbit Ethernet. For this reason, the presence of such service network is regarded as a rather
unconstraining addition on the HPC flavour of the EURETILE architecture. On many-tile embedded
systems, represented in our case by the VEP platform, we maintain at this stage open the definition of
the service network.
We are positing that the bulk of diagnostic data does need neither high bandwidth nor extremely low
latency. This means that performance concerns are not overtly constraining in the building of this service
network and all effort can be instead put in pushing its reliability, by means of ruggedness of components
(for the switches, routers, NICs, cabling, etc.) or some kind of redundancy; reliable Ethernet is a wide
ranging subject with many possible approaches [4].
However, this diagnostic network is a system element itself subject to failure. So, the problem must be
raised of how to deliver fault awareness data in presence of criticality of the service network itself or the
DNP’s. First, we analyze the case of Host and DNP not affected by simultaneous fail, then the case of
simultaneous fail of the DNP and Host on a tile. The hypothesis we put forward is that the probability
for a node of Host and DNP simultaneously failing is significantly smaller than their individual failure
rate. This means that having the host and the DNP mutually cross-checking each other, LO|FA|MO has
meaningful escape routes in both of the following scenarios:
• the DNP breaks down→ the DNP does not respond to queries from the Host - the Host acknowledges
the omission fault and signals it via the service network to the Fault Supervisor (this does not differ
from the ordinary condition).
• the Host breaks down → the Host does not respond to queries from the DNP - although from that
node the service network is inaccessible, the DNP has a last chance of relaying its reports along to
its neighbours in the high-speed 3D mesh and from there, all receiving DNP’s can relay the data to
their own Host and then on to the Fault Supervisor.
Moreover, even in the showstopping event of both Host and DNP breaking down in a node, the system
has a way to become aware of the situation: no more activity from the node means that all the neighbouring
nodes in the 3D mesh become eventually aware of a permanent omission fault in one of their channels;
8as soon as reports of this fact reach the Fault Supervisor, this latter can infer the node has died and take
relevant action.
E. Watchdog implementation
One of the foundation of the LO|FA|MO design is the mutual watchdog mechanism, that for the
EURETILE platform is implemented in the following way: the DNP acts as watchdog for the Host, i.e. it
periodically monitors the Host status as reported in the Host watchdog register updated by the Host itself;
the Host acts as watchdog for the DNP, i.e. it periodically monitors the DNP status as reported in the
DNP Local/Global watchdog register updated by the DNP itself. Although both the mentioned registers are
located inside the DNP they are written (updated) and validated by their ’owner’ and read and invalidated
by the other device. Validation/invalidation consists of setting the Valid Bit to 1 or 0, respectively. The
update period is such that Twrite < Tread, in this way is guaranteed that the reader always founds a valid
status and viceversa, unless a destructive omission fault occurs that makes the writer unable to update its
status register (see section IV-B).
Fig. 4. The Host and the DNP act as reciprocal watchdogs. Even if both the Host and DNP WD Registers are located inside the DNP,
they are periodically updated by their ’owner’ and invalidated by the other device.
9Fault
class
Faulty
Elem. Faults Detector Diagnostic info storage Diagnostic info path
DNP
side
Link
Link sick (CRC
errs)
receiving Link self-test → re-
ceiving DNPfm bits in DNP loc/glb wdregister
DNPfm → Host → Service
NetLink broken
DNPfm on both the receiving
and transmitting side (if link
logic still working), otherwise
on a single side
DNP
◦C/W/V
alert
Temperature
over/under
threshold Sensors → DNPfm bits in DNP loc/glb wdregister
Power
over/under
threshold
Voltage
over/under
threshold
DNP
logic
DNP core sick DNPfm bits in DNP loc/glb wd reg
Host → Service NetDNP core melt-
down
Host (DNPfm misses to update
DNP loc/glb wd register) bit in DNP loc/glb wd reg
Host
side
Host
fault
Memory,
Peripherals
(. . . , Service
Net)
Machine dependent but
managed by the Host fm
Spare room in HOST
watchdog register
DNP → 3D net → Neighbour
DNPfm → Neighbour Host
→ Service NetBus or
total Host
breakdown
DNPfm (Host misses to update
HOST wd reg) bit in RISC wd reg
TABLE II
A SUMMARY OF HOW FAULTS ARE DETECTED (WHICH COMPONENT IS RESPONSIBLE TO DETECT THEM) AND HOW THE INFORMATION IS
CONVEYED BOTTOM-UP TO OBTAIN THE GLOBAL FAULT AWARENESS. (ABBREVIATIONS: DNPFM = DNP FAULT MANAGER;
HOST FM= HOST FAULT MANAGER; NET = NETWORK; LOC/GLB = LOCAL/GLOBAL; WD = WATCHDOG)
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IV. IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
A. LO|FA|MO Status Registers
There are three key registers used by the LO|FA|MO components:
• DNP Local/Global watchdog register. It contains information about: 1- the status of the local DNP
and 2- the status of the Hosts on first neighbouring tiles;
• Host watchdog register. It contains the local Host status;
• Host Remote Fault descriptor register. In case of one or more Host(s) on first neighbour tiles are
faulty, it contains information about the nature of the fault.
For the complete description and layout of these registers refer to the tables III, IV, V, while in section
IV-B their use is detailed.
Table VII provides the encoding for the APEnet+ Temperature register and the corresponding value for
the FPGA temperature as measured by the internal sensor.
DNP local/global watchdog register
# bits bit range field name Description
1 0 Valid 1 : register content valid; 0 : register content not valid
1 1 Host Z-
Status of the first neighbour hosts, 1: fails; 0 : healthy;
1 2 Host Z+
1 3 Host Y-
1 4 Host Y+
1 5 Host X-
1 6 Host X+
2 7-8 DNP core status 00: normal; 01: sick; ??
2 9-10 Power Consumption status 00: normal; 01: warning; 10: alarm
2 11-12 Voltage status 00: normal; 01: warning; 10: alarm
2 13-14 Temperature status 00: normal; 01: warning; 10: alarm
2 15-16 Link Z-
Link status; 00: normal; 01: sick; 10: broken
2 17-18 Link Z+
2 19-20 Link Y-
2 21-22 Link Y+
2 23-24 Link X-
2 25-26 Link X+
5 27-31 Empty
TABLE III
DNP LOCAL/GLOBAL WATCHDOG REGISTER LAYOUT
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Host watchdog register
# bits bit range field name Description
1 0 Valid 1 : register content valid; 0 : register content not valid
2 1-2 Service Net Status Status of the Service Network; 00: normal; 01: sick; 10: broken;
2 3-4 Memory Status Status of Memory; 00: normal; 01: sick; 10: broken;
2 5-6 Peripheral 0 status Status of Peripheral 0; 00: normal; 01: sick; 10: broken;
2 7-8 Peripheral 1 status Status of Peripheral 1; 00: normal; 01: sick; 10: broken;
23 9-31 Empty
TABLE IV
HOST WATCHDOG REGISTER LAYOUT
Host remote fault descriptor register
# bits bit range field name Description
1 0 Z- Service Net Status Status of the Service Network; 0: normal; 1: broken;
1 1 Z- Memory Status Status of Memory; 0: normal; 1: broken;
1 2 Z- Peripheral 0 status Status of Peripheral 0; 0: normal; 1: broken;
1 3 Z- Peripheral 1 status Status of Peripheral 1; 0:normal; 1: broken;
1 4 Z+ Service Net Status Status of the Service Network; 0: normal; 1: broken;
1 5 Z+ Memory Status Status of Memory; 0: normal; 1: broken;
1 6 Z+ Peripheral 0 status Status of Peripheral 0; 0: normal; 1: broken;
1 7 Z+ Peripheral 1 status Status of Peripheral 1; 0:normal; 1: broken;
1 8 Y- Service Net Status Status of the Service Network; 0: normal; 1: broken;
1 9 Y- Memory Status Status of Memory; 0: normal; 1: broken;
1 10 Y- Peripheral 0 status Status of Peripheral 0; 0: normal; 1: broken;
1 11 Y- Peripheral 1 status Status of Peripheral 1; 0:normal; 1: broken;
1 12 Y+ Service Net Status Status of the Service Network; 0: normal; 1: broken;
1 13 Y+ Memory Status Status of Memory; 0: normal; 1: broken;
1 14 Y+ Peripheral 0 status Status of Peripheral 0; 0: normal; 1: broken;
1 15 Y+ Peripheral 1 status Status of Peripheral 1; 0:normal; 1: broken;
1 16 X- Service Net Status Status of the Service Network; 0: normal; 1: broken;
1 17 X- Memory Status Status of Memory; 0: normal; 1: broken;
1 18 X- Peripheral 0 status Status of Peripheral 0; 0: normal; 1: broken;
1 19 X- Peripheral 1 status Status of Peripheral 1; 0:normal; 1: broken;
1 20 X+ Service Net Status Status of the Service Network; 0: normal; 1: broken;
1 21 X+ Memory Status Status of Memory; 0: normal; 1: broken;
1 22 X+ Peripheral 0 status Status of Peripheral 0; 0: normal; 1: broken;
1 23 X+ Peripheral 1 status Status of Peripheral 1; 0:normal; 1: broken;
8 24-31 empty
TABLE V
HOST REMOTE FAULTS DESCRIPTOR REGISTER
12
NAME DNP-VEP reg APEnet+ reg Description
address mask reg number mask
LO|FA|MO DNP local/global
watchdog
0x00000ec0 0x07ffffff TBD TBD DNP local/global watchdog
LO|FA|MO Host watchdog 0x00000ec4 0x000001ff TBD TBD Host local watchdog
LO|FA|MO Host remote fault
descriptor
0x00000ec8 0x00ffffff TBD TBD Host remote fault descriptor
Temperature 0x00000f40 0x000000ff 54 0x0000ff00 Temperature value
Power consumption TBD TBD TBD TBD Power consumption value
Voltage TBD TBD TBD TBD Voltage value
Temp thresholds 0x000000f00 0xffffffff TBD 0xffffffff Boundaries for the normal,
warning, alarm temperature
ranges
Power thresholds TBD 0xffffffff TBD 0xffffffff Boundaries for the normal,
warning, alarm power con-
sumption ranges
Voltage thresholds TBD 0xffffffff TBD 0xffffffff Boundaries for the normal,
warning, alarm temperature
ranges
Maxhops 0x00000008 0x000000ff 46 0x000000ff Set the maximum number of
hops
Router exceptions 0x00000140
0x00000144
0xffffffff
0x00003fff
29 0x0000002f Router status/exceptions
Channel XP exceptions 0x00000440 0x000000ff 35 0xfe000000 Link status/exceptions
Channel XM exceptions 0x00000540 0x000000ff 36 0xfe000000 Link status/exceptions
Channel YP exceptions 0x00000640 0x000000ff 37 0xfe000000 Link status/exceptions
Channel YM exceptions 0x00000740 0x000000ff 38 0xfe000000 Link status/exceptions
Channel ZP exceptions 0x00000840 0x000000ff 39 0xfe000000 Link status/exceptions
Channel ZM exceptions 0x00000940 0x000000ff 40 0xfe000000 Link status/exceptions
RDMA Exception 0x00000240 0x000000ff 0 0x00000002 RDMA status
ENGINE Exceptions 0x000000c0 0x00000fff N.A. N.A. ENGINE status/exceptions
PCI Exceptions N.A. N.A. 9 0xffffffff PCI status/exceptions
TABLE VI
DNP-VEP AND APENET+ REGISTERS MEANINGFUL FOR THE FAULTS DETECTION.
Value (hex) FF E4 D5 D0 B2 9E 8A 80 76 6C 62 4E 3A
Temp (◦C) 127 100 85 80 50 30 10 0 -10 -20 -30 -50 -70
TABLE VII
TEMPERATURE VALUES AND THEIR ENCODING FOR THE DNP TEMPERATURE REGISTER
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B. Fault Detection/Signaling Hypothesis
In this section we list the faults and critical events managed by the EURETILE implementation of
the LO|FA|MO design. For each fault listed, we provide two paragraphs: 1- Fault description: how
it is detected (which component is in charge of detecting such fault) and 2- Fault detection: how the
information is conveyed upwards to obtain the systemic Fault Awareness.
DNP Link sick Fault description: A malfunction of the physical channel (e.g. the cable is
damaged, incorrectly plugged in, a source of interference is in its range, etc.)
can lead to errors during packets transmission, resulting in data corruption
(commission fault). APEnet+ link logic implements Cyclic Redundancy Check
with the CRC-32 IEEE standard polynomial: for packet sizes from 256 bits up
to 65792, which are the minimum and maximum sizes that APEnet+ transmits,
this CRC is able to detect a maximum number of errors1 that ranges from 6
down to 2 [5]. The error detection is performed by the receiving DNP card.
A link is considered sick when the ratio between the number of errors and
the number of packets received by that link overruns a given (programmable)
threshold.
Fault detection: It is detected by the DNP links self-test logic on the receiving
side, that signals the faulty (number of errors over threshold) situation to the
DNP fault manager. The information is stored in the DNP local/global watchdog
register where it is caught by the Host during the periodical DNP monitoring
operated by the local Fault Supervisor. As the DNP 3D network is affected by
this fault the local FS can communicate the faulty status to the other nodes via
the Service Network.
DNP Link broken Fault description: The physical channel is severed (e.g. cable unplugged or
broken) or there is a total failure of the link logic on (just) one the two
transferring sides (RX, TX) preventing the message to be transmitted (omission
fault). This situation can be diagnosed by the link logic (when correctly
operating) because the operativity of the physical channel implies a handshaking
protocol between the RX and TX sides. As a consequence, a broken cable can
be detected by both the receiving and transmitting DNP.
Fault detection: It is detected by the DNP links self-test logic both on the
receiving and transmitting side, that signal the faulty situation to the DNP fault
manager. The information is stored in the DNP local/global watchdog register
where it is caught by the Host during the periodical DNP monitoring operated
by the local Fault Supervisor. As the DNP 3D network is affected by this fault
the FS can communicate the faulty status to the other nodes via the Service
Network.
1The number of errors are here identified by the Hamming distance between the corrupted and the uncorrupted messages, i.e. the number
of flipped bits.
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DNP Temperature
over/under threshold
Fault description: APEnet+ provides a sensor measuring the FPGA die
temperature. This information can be both routed to the board’s control devices
and to into the FPGA itself. At the moment a control logic is implemented
as part of the DNP core to convey this temperature information to a DNP
register encoded as shown in table VII. Four thresholds can be defined for
the temperature on the basis of the reference temperature limits for correct
operativity, in order to set the boundaries for the ranges of: normal operativity,
warning needed for over/under conditions and alarm raised. The LO|FA|MO
design makes APEnet+ able to check the temperature and detect and signal an
over-under-threshold situation.
Fault detection: The DNP Local Fault Manager checks the DNP temperature
status and therefore periodically sets (together with the other DNP Status
information ) the Temperature Status fields in the DNP Local/Global register,
which is periodically monitored by the Host Fault Manager (see Watchdog
mechanism specification in section III-E). In this way the Host Fault Manager
can become aware of the warning or alarming temperature status of the local
DNP and send messages to the Fault Supervisor through the Service Network
(see figure 5).
DNP Power
over/under threshold
Fault description and Fault Detection: Similar to the DNP Temperature
over/under threshold case.
DNP Voltage
over/under threshold
Fault description and Fault Detection: Similar to the DNP Temperature
over/under threshold case.
Fig. 5. Temperature over/under-threshold fault detection and signaling.
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DNP core sick Fault description: One or more fault in the DNP core internal logic that cause
commission. Typical faults involve the routing logic (e.g. a symptom of this kind
of fault can be for example an overthreshold number of hops) or the RDMA
engine. Each of this faults has a related Exception Register in the DNP register
file, so we consider sick a DNP that has raised an exception.
Fault detection:In case that one or more faults in the DNP core logic that cause
exceptions, the DNP Local Fault Manager set fields in the DNP Local/Global
Status register. This sick status is periodically checked by the Host Fault
Manager that can communicate this faulty status (and more detailed information
that it can retrieve by the DNP registers) to other nodes via the Service Network.
DNP core
meltdown
Fault description: A fault in the DNP core internal logic that causes DNP
operativity to be totally and fatally compromised. This kind of fault can be
detected by the DNP fault manager component inside the DNP itself in case it
is still healthy or by the Host thanks to the watchdog mechanism described in
section III-E.
Fault detection: A fatal fault causes the DNP Local Fault Manager to stop its
periodic status report in the DNP Local/Global Status register. The Host Fault
Manager can detect this situation (see Watchdog mechanism specification in
section III-E) and signal the fault at global level by sending messages via the
Service Network (see figure 6).
Fig. 6. DNP core meltdown fault detection and signaling.
16
HOST Memory,
Peripherals (Service
Network, . . . ) broken
Fault description: Any possible commission fault (on the Host side) that
the Host itself can detect or become aware of. By definition, these faults
are platform-dependent and can be included in the watchdog fault detection
mechanism as described in section III-E.
Fault detection: In case one or more Host Peripherals (DNP excluded) have
a fault or are broken the Host Local Fault Manager should be able to detect
the problem and communicate the faulty status to the upper hierarchy layers
of the Fault Supervisor via the Service Network, when not faulty, or the 3D
network. To use the 3D network diagnostic info path, the Host Local Fault
Manager writes the Host Watchdog register signaling the faulty devices. The
DNP Fault Manager that periodically checks this register becomes aware of the
faults and prepare a diagnostic info packet to be sent through the 3D network.
Once received by the neighbouring DNPs the information is reported as follows:
a bit is raised in the Global fields of the DNP Watchdog register showing the
direction of the faulty neighbour node; the proper field is set in the Host Remote
Fault Descriptor register to convey the type of fault and/or the device affected
by it.
Total HOST break-
down and/or bus bro-
ken
Fault description: Any fault on the Host side that causes a Host omission
failure. In this category we also include Bus omission faults because from the
DNP point of view a broken Bus and a completely non operating Host do not
differ, as both these situations are detected by the watchdog mechanism as a
lack of activity from the Host side (see section III-E).
Fault detection: A fault that jeopardizes the ability of the Host to update the
Host Watchdog register is easily detected by the DNP Fault Manager that reads
a not valid status on that register and sends diagnostic a diagnostic packet to
the DNP’s first neighbours. The information is received and processed by the
neighbouring DNP Fault Managers marks in their DNP watchdog registers the
fields corresponding to the faulty node. In this way the Host Fault Manager
that monitors that register can become aware of the situation and send packets
to upper hierarchy layers of the Fault Supervisor via the Service Network (see
figure 7).
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Fig. 7. Host breakdown detection and signaling.
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